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 O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Plaintiff Karl S. Schumann, proceeding as a qui tam 
relator under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 
et seq., and corresponding state laws, appeals the District 
Court’s orders granting motions to dismiss by defendants 
Bristol-Meyers Squib Company, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company, and DuPont Pharmaceuticals Company (together, 
BMS), and defendants AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP and 
AstraZeneca LP (together, AZ).  Schumann alleges 
defendants (1) improperly induced Medco Health Solutions, 
Inc., his employer, to offer certain of defendants’ drugs in its 
mail-order pharmacies and in health plans it managed; (2) did 
not include those inducements when calculating the best price 
for their drugs, and thus submitted inaccurate best price 
reports to the government; (3) overcharged the government 
based on those inaccurate best prices; and (4) underpaid 
rebates owed based on those inaccurate best prices. 
 
 The District Court found it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over Schumann’s claims because he did not have 
the requisite direct and independent knowledge to satisfy the 
original source exception to the FCA’s public disclosure bar.  
As a result, the court dismissed Schumann’s claims with 





A. FCA Statutory Framework 
 As we have previously explained in great detail, the 
FCA makes it unlawful to knowingly submit a fraudulent 
claim to the government.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2005); 
United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 
738 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Stinson, 
Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 
F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1991).  “The qui tam provision 
of the [FCA], permits, in certain circumstances, suits by 
private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone 
submitting a false claim to the Government.  Prior to 1986, 
such suits were barred if the information on which they were 
based was already in the Government’s possession.”  Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 
941 (1997). 
 
 In 1986, Congress amended the FCA to encourage 
private plaintiffs—relators, in FCA parlance—to bring civil 
cases if they had information that someone had defrauded the 
government.  See False Claims Amendments Act (FCAA), 
Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 
3729-33 (1988)); Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 293-95, 
298 (2010).  But, “to strike a balance between encouraging 
private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic 
lawsuits,” Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 295, Congress added 
the public disclosure bar to withdraw jurisdiction over, among 
other things, suits based on information that had been 
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previously disclosed unless “the person bringing the action is 
an original source of the information.”  FCAA § 3 (codified at 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A));
1
 see also United States ex rel. 
Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 518-19 & 
n.20 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing purpose behind FCAA and 
public disclosure bar).  Congress defined an “original source” 
as “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge 
of the information on which the allegations are based and has 
voluntarily provided the information to the Government 
before filing an action under this section which is based on 
the information.”  FCAA § 3 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(e)(4)(B)).  
                                              
1
  In full, the FCAA’s public disclosure bar provided: 
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action 
under this section based upon the public 
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a 
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a 
congressional, administrative, or Government 
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or from the news media, unless 
the action is brought by the Attorney General 
or the person bringing the action is an original 
source of the information. 
In 2010, Congress amended Section 3730(e)(4).  See Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901-02 (2010).  
Because that amendment does not apply retroactively to 
Schumann’s 2003-filed case, see Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 
283 n.1, we will discuss the now-superseded version of the 
FCA in the present tense and refer to that version as if it were 




B. Medicaid and Related Statutory Framework 
 Under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, a 
participating drug manufacturer agrees to pay rebates to state 
Medicaid programs in exchange for those programs covering 
the cost of a manufacturer’s drugs.  See Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4401, 104 
Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
8 (2012)); see also Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty, 131 
S. Ct. 1342, 1345-46 (2011).  The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) determines the amount of the rebate 
using a statutory formula based on a manufacturer’s average 
and best prices for a particular drug.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-8(c).  Each manufacturer calculates these prices—
which is “a complex enterprise requiring recourse to detailed 
information about the company’s sales and pricing,” Astra, 
131 S. Ct. at 1346 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8(k); 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 447.500–520) (2010)2—and submits them to HHS each 
quarter, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8(b)(3).  HHS may not disclose a 
manufacturer’s reported prices except in certain 
circumstances.  Astra, 131 S. Ct. at 1346 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-8(b)(3)(D) (2010)). 
 
                                              
2
  Subject to certain exceptions, the reported best price is “the 
lowest price available from the manufacturer during the 
rebate period to any wholesaler, retailer, provider, health 
maintenance organization, nonprofit entity, or governmental 
entity within the United States.”  42 U.S.C. § 1369r-
8(c)(1)(C)(i).  Among other things, the best price must 
account for certain cash discounts, free goods, volume 
discounts, and rebates.  Id. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
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 Pertinent here, a drug maker participating in Medicaid 
must also comply with Section 340B of the Public Health 
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a).  That section prohibits a 
manufacturer from charging certain state-operated programs 
that receive federal funds more than the average price for its 
drugs, as defined by the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, less 
a specified rebate percentage.  See Astra, 131 S. Ct. at 1346.  
In addition, the federal anti-kickback statute (AKS) prohibits 
a drug maker from knowingly offering any remuneration to 
induce others to cause the government to pay for its drugs.  
Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 





 At all relevant times, BMS participated in Medicaid’s 
Drug Rebate Program with regard to its anticoagulant 
Coumadin, and AZ participated in the program with regard to 
its proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) Nexium and Prilosec.  Both 
companies also participated in the Section 340B program 
with those drugs, and sold those drugs to government health 
care programs.  Therefore, the companies were prohibited 
from, and subject to liability under the FCA for, misreporting 
their average and best prices for those drugs, over-charging or 
under-rebating the government based on those prices, and 
improperly inducing others to cause the government to pay 
for their drugs.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilkins v. 
United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 311-13 & n.19 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (finding FCA claim properly pleaded where 
plaintiff alleged defendant’s claim for payment was false due 
                                              
3
  Congress’s 2010 amendment of the AKS, see PPACA § 
6402(f), 124 Stat. at 759, also does not apply retroactively 
here.  See Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 283 n.1. 
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to a violation of the pre-PPACA AKS); Hutchins v. Wilentz, 
Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(noting FCA liability attaches to conduct that causes or would 
cause government economic loss). 
 
C. Facts and Procedural History 
 From 1999 to 2003, Schumann was Vice President of 
Pharmaceutical Contracting for Medco, a large national 
pharmacy benefit manager (PBM).  As a PBM, Medco 
manages mail-order pharmacies and pharmacy benefits for 
health plans, including those offered by various federal and 
state government entities to qualifying employees, and 
contracts with drug makers, including BMS and AZ, to offer 
their products in the health plans Medco manages.  Health 
plans retain PBMs such as Medco “to efficiently manage their 
benefit plans and to achieve cost savings” by “negotiating 
discounts or rebates from drug manufacturers, providing mail 
order prescription service to plan members, contracting with 
retail pharmacies for reimbursement when prescriptions are 
filled for plan members, and electronic processing and paying 
of claims.”  In re Pharmacy Benefit Mgrs. Antitrust Litig., 
582 F.3d 432, 434 (3d Cir. 2009).  As a result, Medco had the 
power to determine whether BMS’s and AZ’s products would 
be available to patients covered by plans it managed, to 
negotiate the price at which such products would be available, 
and to influence the average and best prices for BMS and AZ 
products. 
 
 Schumann filed his initial Complaint under seal in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on September 26, 2003, on 
behalf of the federal government, eleven states, and the 
District of Columbia.  Schumann subsequently filed under 
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seal a First Amended Complaint on November 9, 2005, and a 
Second Amended Complaint on November 22, 2006.  On 
June 15, 2009, after the government declined to intervene, the 
District Court lifted the seal for all matters occurring on or 
after that date and accepted Schumann’s Third Amended 
Complaint (TAC) for filing. 
 
 BMS moved to dismiss the TAC under Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing Schumann 
was not an original source under the FCA and had failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Schumann 
responded by seeking leave to further amend his complaint to 
address the issues in BMS’s motion and to avoid any delay 
resulting from a dismissal without prejudice.  The court 
granted Schumann’s request and denied BMS’s motion as 
moot.  Schumann then filed the Corrected Fourth Amended 
Complaint (CFAC), the operative pleading.   
 
 In the CFAC, Schumann alleges that, from December 
1997 until March 2003, BMS induced Medco to make 
Coumadin the exclusive anticoagulant in its mail-order 
pharmacies by paying sham data fees and rebates up to 63% 
off Coumadin’s wholesale price.  Schumann further alleges 
BMS improperly omitted those payments when calculating 
Medco’s cost for Coumadin, thereby avoiding setting a new 
best price for the drug and inaccurately reporting its best price 
to the government.   
 
 Schumann states that he learned of BMS’s conduct 
through his job at Medco.  More precisely, he pleads facts 
indicating that he reviewed confidential agreements between 
Medco and BMS providing for data fees and rebates, 
discussed the history of those agreements with Medco and 
11 
 
BMS officials, and negotiated extensions of those agreements 
(including an increase in Medco’s rebate).  He further asserts 
that BMS paid Medco such high rebates and fees because it 
intended to provide kickbacks while evading applicable best-
price reporting statutes. 
 
 Schumann further alleges that from 1996 through 
2007, AZ used improper rebates and payments to induce 
Medco to offer Prilosec and Nexium as the exclusive PPIs in 
Medco’s mail-order pharmacies, and to prefer those drugs in 
the formularies of two health plans Medco managed.  
Specifically, Schumann alleges AZ withheld Prilosec rebates 
unless Medco placed Nexium on its preferred formulary, paid 
post-patent rebates on Prilosec if Medco preferred Nexium 
over generic PPIs, reduced Medco’s cost of Prilosec and 
Nexium to match the cost of generics, and charged Medco the 
cost of a generic if Medco substituted Prilosec for a generic 
prescription.  In addition, Schumann alleges AZ improperly 
paid Medco and health plans it managed $100 million under 
two disease-management agreements, $500,000 via an 
educational grant to “push Prilosec,” $1.2 million to market 
Nexium, and $200,000 to subsidize use of the AZ data-
analysis program RationalMed.  Finally, Schumann alleges 
AZ improperly failed to incorporate these rebates and 
payments into its best-price calculations, and thereby 
submitted false best-price reports and caused the government 
to overpay for AZ drugs.   
Schumann states that he learned about AZ’s improper activity 
in his role at Medco.  Specifically, he says he gained the 
knowledge by reviewing contracts between Medco and AZ 
and internal Medco documents describing the history of the 
companies’ dealings; discussing rebates, formulary 
placement, disease-management agreements, and other 
12 
 
payment vehicles with Medco colleagues and AZ officials; 
negotiating extensions of various agreements and structuring 
them to entice health plans managed by Medco to favor AZ 
PPIs; and, at AZ’s behest, encouraging those plans to favor 
AZ PPIs.  In addition, he asserts that it was AZ’s intent to 
bribe Medco and plans it managed to favor AZ PPIs and to 
structure deals to evade best-price reporting obligations. 
 
 Based on these allegations, the CFAC brings four FCA 
claims against each defendant, under AKS-violation and 
inaccurate best-price theories of liability.
4
  First, Schumann 
contends defendants knowingly presented or caused to be 
presented to the government false claims for payment.  See 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).  Second, he contends defendants 
knowingly made or used, or caused to be made or used, false 
records or statements that caused false claims to be paid or 
approved by the government.  See id. § 3729(a)(2).  Third, he 
contends defendants knowingly conspired with Medco and 
others to violate Sections 3729(a)(1) and (2).  See id. § 
3729(a)(3).  Finally, he contends defendants avoided or 
decreased their obligations to pay the government by 
knowingly making or using false records or statements, or by 
causing such records to be made or used.  See id. § 
3729(a)(7).   
 
                                              
4
  In 2009, Congress amended the FCA and re-designated 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(7) as 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G).  
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. 
L. No. 111–21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621-22 (2009).  Because 
Schumann’s claims arose before 2009, the CFAC properly 
cites the pre-FERA version of the FCA.  See Wilkins, 659 
F.3d at 303.  We do so as well. 
13 
 
 Defendants separately moved to dismiss the CFAC 
with prejudice.  BMS again moved under Rule 12(b)(1), 
arguing the FCA’s public disclosure bar divested the court of 
jurisdiction, and both BMS and AZ moved under Rule 
12(b)(6), arguing Schumann had not pleaded the facts 
underlying his claims with sufficient particularity.  Schumann 
opposed both defendants’ motions.  The court granted BMS’s 
motion, finding that Schumann’s claims against BMS were 
substantially similar to prior public disclosures and that 
Schumann lacked the requisite knowledge to be an original 
source under the FCA.  The court also found that amending 
the CFAC would be futile and therefore dismissed 
Schumann’s claims with prejudice.  The court denied AZ’s 
motion, however, because it found that Schumann had alleged 
AZ’s fraud with sufficient particularity. 
 
 Schumann timely moved for reconsideration as to 
claims against BMS, arguing that he satisfied the FCA’s 
original source exception.
5
  In support of his motion, 
Schumann submitted a twelve-page declaration purporting to 
add facts that he had omitted from the CFAC.  In pertinent 
part, he stated he had learned of BMS’s conduct by reviewing 
existing agreements and internal documents in Medco files, 
discussing them with Medco colleagues, negotiating rebate 
and data fee agreements with BMS, and comparing the terms 
of those agreements with others he had seen in his years in 
the pharmacy-benefits industry.  He further stated that in 
negotiations that had occurred before he arrived at Medco, 
and in those in which he participated, BMS officials had 
                                              
5
  Schumann did not challenge the court’s finding that his 




expressed concern about setting a new best price for 
Coumadin.  Finally, he stated that he had deduced, based on 
his “cumulative knowledge” and the supposed irrationality of 
the terms to which BMS had agreed, that BMS was illegally 
paying kickbacks to Medco and misreporting Coumadin’s 
best price.  In a written decision, the court declined to 
consider Schumann’s supplemental declaration, because it 
was not new evidence, and denied his motion for 
reconsideration. 
 
 AZ then moved to dismiss the CFAC under Rule 
12(b)(1).  Schumann opposed the motion and submitted a 
thirty-five page declaration to further explain his duties at 
Medco and how he learned about AZ’s allegedly 
inappropriate conduct.  Specifically, he described reviewing 
internal files and documents; speaking with Medco colleagues 
and officials from AZ and plans managed by Medco; 
participating in rebate and formulary negotiations with AZ 
and those plans; and encouraging those plans to accept AZ’s 
inducements and to prefer its PPIs.  He also added that his 
knowledge of AZ’s dealings and his experience in the 
industry led him to conclude that AZ was paying kickbacks to 
Medco and health plans it managed, and skirting its best-price 
obligations.  The court granted AZ’s motion, finding that 
Schumann’s claims against AZ, like those against BMS, were 
based on publicly disclosed information and that he was not 
an original source under the FCA.  The court also dismissed 
Schumann’s claims against AZ with prejudice because it 
found further amendment of the CFAC would be futile.  







 Schumann brought his FCA claims in federal court 
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3732.  We have jurisdiction to review 
the District Court’s final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
B. Standard of Review 
 This Court exercises plenary review over a district 
court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Paranich, 396 F.3d at 331 (citing Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1152). 
 
 The parties agree that AZ’s motion to dismiss was a 
factual attack on jurisdiction, but they disagree about whether 
BMS’s motion to dismiss was a facial or factual attack.  The 
distinction is theoretically important because a court may 
consider matters outside the pleadings in a factual challenge, 
but must take the complaint at face value and construe it as 
true in a facial challenge.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 514 
(citing Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 
176-78 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Here, however, the distinction makes 
no difference:  as we detail below, neither the CFAC’s 
allegations alone, nor those allegations plus Schumann’s 
supplemental declarations, meet his burden to satisfy that he 
is an original source of his claims against either BMS or AZ.  
See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 515 (noting relator’s burden to 




C. Original Source Exception6 
 We have previously expounded on what it means to 
have both “direct and independent knowledge” under the 
original source exception to the FCA’s public disclosure bar.  
See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160 (noting conjunctive “and” 
indicates “direct” and “independent” each impose distinct 
requirements).  “‘Direct knowledge’ is knowledge obtained 
without any ‘intervening agency, instrumentality, or 
influence:  immediate.’”  Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 520 (quoting 
Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160).  Such knowledge has also been 
described as “first-hand, seen with the relator’s own eyes, 
unmediated by anything but [the relator’s] own labor, and by 
the relator’s own efforts, and not by the labors of others, and . 
. . not derivative of the information of others.”  Paranich, 396 
F.3d at 336 & n.11 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1161 (citing with 
approval cases finding information is not direct if learned 
from “a whistleblowing insider” or by “stumbl[ing] across an 
interesting court file”).  The independent knowledge 
requirement means that “knowledge of the fraud cannot be 
merely dependent on a public disclosure.”  Paranich, 396 
F.3d at 336 (quoting United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum 
Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999)).  
In other words, “a relator who would not have learned of the 
information absent public disclosure [does] not have 
‘independent’ information” under the FCA.  Stinson, 944 F.2d 
at 1160. 
 
                                              
6
  Schumann does not appeal the finding below that all of his 
claims are based on publicly disclosed information, and are 
thus barred unless he is an original source under the FCA. 
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 We have also described the type of information a 
relator must know directly and independently.  In Stinson, for 
example, we explained that: 
 
Undoubtedly, it is not necessary for a relator 
to have all the relevant information in order to 
qualify as “independent.”  Nonetheless, the 
relator must possess substantive information 
about the particular fraud, rather than merely 
background information which enables a 
putative relator to understand the significance 
of a publicly disclosed transaction or 
allegation.  If the latter were enough to qualify 
the relator as an “original source,” then a 
cryptographer who translated a ciphered 
document in a public court record would be an 
“original source,” an unlikely interpretation of 
the phrase. 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  We expanded on Stinson eight 
years later, holding that a relator was “not an ‘original source’ 
because it did not have ‘direct and independent knowledge’ of 
the most critical element of its claims, viz., that the 
[defendant] had made the alleged misrepresentations to [the 
government] . . ..”  United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. 
Housing Auth. of the City of Pitt., 186 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citing Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160).
7
  Stated differently, 
                                              
7
  Accord In re Nat. Gas Royalties, 562 F.3d 1032, 1046 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (relator needs direct and independent knowledge of 
“substantial” portion of allegations); United States v. N.Y. 
Med. Coll., 252 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (relator must be 
original source of “core information”); United States ex rel. 
18 
 
although a relator need not “‘have all the relevant information 
in order to qualify as “independent,”’ a relator cannot be said 
to have ‘direct and independent knowledge of the information 
on which [its fraud] allegations are based,’ if the relator has 
no direct and independent knowledge of the allegedly 
fraudulent statements.”  Id. at 389 (quoting Stinson, 944 F.2d 
at 1160).   
 
 Although not previously discussed in the original 
source context, the algebraic expression we have used to aid 
our analysis of whether the information underlying a relator’s 
claim has been publicly disclosed also serves as a helpful 
guidepost for understanding what information a relator must 
know directly and independently.  As we laid out in Atkinson: 
 
“[I]f X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation 
of fraud and X and Y represent its essential 
elements. In order to disclose the fraudulent 
transaction publicly, the combination of X 
and Y must be revealed, from which readers 
or listeners may infer Z, i.e., the conclusion 
that fraud has been committed.”  To draw 
an inference of fraud, both a misrepresented 
[X] and a true [Y] state of facts must be 
publicly disclosed.  So, if either Z (fraud) or 
both X (misrepresented facts) and Y (true 
facts) are disclosed . . . then a relator is 
barred from bringing suit under § 
                                                                                                     
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 657 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (requiring direct and independent knowledge 
of “any essential element of the underlying fraud 
transaction”).   
19 
 
3730(e)(4)(A) unless he is an original 
source. 
Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 519 (quoting Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 
741).  Extending this reasoning into the analysis under 
Section 3730(e)(4)(B), a relator must have direct and 
independent knowledge of either Z, the alleged fraud, or both 
X and Y, the false and true sets of facts, to qualify under the 
FCA’s original source exception.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 
519; see also Springfield Terminal, 14 F.3d at 657. 
 
D. Application 
 Having outlined the contours of the original source 
exception, we now apply that law to the facts at bar to 
determine whether Schumann is an original source of the 
information underlying each of his claims.  See Rockwell Int’l 
Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 476 (2007) (“Section 
3730(e)(4) does not permit jurisdiction in gross just because a 
relator is an original source with respect to some claim.”); see 
also United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 205 F.3d 97, 101-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting FCA’s 
reference to “action” may reasonably be read to mean “claim” 
because the statute envisions a single-claim complaint). 
 
1. Claims Against BMS 
 Schumann alleges he obtained direct and independent 
knowledge of his AKS and best-price claims against BMS in 
the same fashion.  Specifically, he states in the CFAC that he 
learned of BMS’s allegedly improper conduct by reviewing 
confidential data fee and rebate agreements, discussing them 
with his Medco colleagues and BMS officials, and 
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negotiating their extension.  In his supplemental declaration, 
Schumann repeats the bases for his knowledge mentioned in 
the CFAC, and adds that he reviewed confidential documents 
in Medco’s negotiation files, discussed them with colleagues, 
and understood that BMS was concerned the agreements 
would set a new best price for Coumadin.  He also states that 
his experience led him to conclude that BMS could not have 
afforded to enter into the rebate and data fee agreements if it 
was complying with applicable anti-kickback and best-price 
statutes.   
 
 None of these allegations is sufficient for Schumann to 
plead that he is an original source of the key components of 
his claims against BMS.  First, knowledge of a scheme is not 
direct when it is gained by reviewing files and discussing the 
documents therein with individuals who actually participated 
in the memorialized events.  See Paranich, 396 F.3d at 335-
36; Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160-61.  Second, Schumann’s 
description of his involvement in Medco’s business with 
BMS, including negotiating rebate and data fee agreements 
and recognizing that BMS was aware of its best-price 
reporting obligations, does not evince direct and independent 
knowledge of any improper kickback or inaccurate best-price 
report.  See Paranich, 396 F.3d at 336 & n.11 (noting such 
knowledge gained when relator’s involvement constituted 
filing false claims on defendant’s behalf); Houck on behalf of 
the United States v. Folding Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 
505 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding relator’s knowledge direct when 
he was involved by helping others file false claims); see also 
In re Pharmacy Benefit Mgrs. Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d at 434 
(explaining PBMs negotiate discounts and rebates from drug 
makers).  Finally, Schumann’s conclusions that BMS 
intended to pay kickbacks to Medco and to submit false 
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claims to the government, based on his experience in and 
understanding of the PBM industry, do not qualify as 
independent knowledge under the FCA.  See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 
240 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly rejected the 
argument that a relator’s knowledge is independent when it is 
gained through the application of expertise to information 
publicly disclosed under § 3730(e)(4)(A).” (citing Atkinson, 
473 F.3d at 526 n.27; Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160)); see also 
Rockwell, 549 U.S. at 475-76 (rejecting FCA claim premised 
on relator correctly predicting submission of a false claim); 
United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 353 
(4th Cir. 2009) (“[M]ere suspicion that there must be a false 
or fraudulent claim lurking around somewhere simply does 
not carry [relator’s] burden of proving that he is entitled to 
original source status.”). 
 
 At bottom, then, the facts alleged in Schumann’s 
CFAC and supplemental declaration do not indicate he has 
direct and independent knowledge of BMS’s actual best price 
for Coumadin or how it was calculated; the inaccurate best 
price BMS reported to the government or how it was 
calculated, or any improper payments made to Medco or its 
health plans; or any false or fraudulent claim submitted or 
caused to be submitted by BMS.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 
519-20.  Therefore, Schumann does not qualify as an original 
source of his FCA claims against BMS. 
 
2. Claims Against AZ 
 Schumann also purports to show direct and 
independent knowledge of the information underlying his 
AKS and best-price claims against AZ.  In the CFAC, he 
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pleads that he learned of AZ’s alleged kickback and best-
price-misreporting schemes by reviewing confidential 
agreements and internal documents reflecting the history of 
relations between Medco and AZ; discussing formularies, 
rebates, various fee arrangements, and best-price implications 
with Medco colleagues and AZ officials; negotiating 
extensions of those agreements and arrangements; and 
encouraging health plans managed by Medco to favor AZ 
PPIs.  Schumann repeats these factual bases in his 
supplemental declaration in opposition to AZ’s motion to 
dismiss, and adds that, based on his years of experience, AZ 
paid kickbacks to Medco and health plans it managed, and 
failed to incorporate those payments into applicable best-price 
reports.   
 
 Under the now-familiar case law, these allegations are 
insufficient to plead original source status.  As discussed 
above, Schumann’s knowledge is not direct because it came 
from reviewing documents and discussing them with 
colleagues who participated in the underlying events.  See 
Paranich, 396 F.3d at 335-36; Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160-61.  
In addition, although he has direct and independent 
knowledge of AZ’s business strategies, and of certain 
payments made by AZ to Medco and health plans it managed 
(which he pejoratively terms “Special Deals”), he does not 
have such knowledge that those strategies or payments 
involved kickbacks or submission of inaccurate best-price 
reports.  And his knowledge that AZ was aware of its best-
price obligations does not indicate AZ intended to evade such 
obligations.  Instead, Schumann substitutes experience-based 
belief that misconduct was occurring for the requisite direct 
and independent knowledge.  This is plainly insufficient to 
qualify as an original source under the FCA.  See, e.g., Zizic, 
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728 F.3d at 240 (citing Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 526 n.27; 
Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160-61); see also Rockwell, 549 U.S. at 
475-76. 
 
 Therefore, Schumann fails to aver facts indicating he 
has direct and independent knowledge of any improper 
kickbacks from AZ to Medco or to health plans Medco 
managed; AZ’s actual best price for Prilosec or Nexium; 
AZ’s reported best price for those drugs; how AZ calculated 
the actual or reported best prices for Prilosec or Nexium; or 
any false or fraudulent claim submitted or caused to be 
submitted by AZ.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 519-20.  
Accordingly, he is not an original source of the information 




E. Denial of Schumann’s Motion For 
Reconsideration As To BMS 
 The Court reviews “a denial of a motion for 
reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but we review the 
District Court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and 
factual determinations for clear error.”  Howard Hess Dental 
Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 
 “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration ... is to 
                                              
8
  Because we find Schumann lacked the requisite knowledge 
to qualify as an original source of any of his claims, we need 
not decide whether he “voluntarily provided the information 
[underlying his claims] to the Government before filing” his 
claims.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
24 
 
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly 
discovered evidence.”  Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 
F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  “Accordingly, a judgment may 
be altered or amended if the party seeking reconsideration 
shows at least one of the following grounds:  (1) an 
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability 
of new evidence that was not available when the court 
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to 
correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest 
injustice.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
 In support of his motion for reconsideration, 
Schumann submitted his twelve-page supplemental 
declaration in an attempt to plead the facts the District Court 
had found the CFAC lacked.  The court followed Third 
Circuit precedent and declined to consider such “new” 
evidence, which Schumann could have submitted in 
opposition to BMS’s motion to dismiss.  See id.  The court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in disregarding 
Schumann’s supplemental declaration.  See Howard Hess 
Dental Labs., 602 F.3d at 251-52 (citing Harsco Corp. v. 
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)).
9
  And it did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Schumann’s reconsideration 
motion, which was not based on a change in law, newly 
available evidence, or manifest injustice.  See Max’s Seafood 
Café, 176 F.3d at 677. 
 
 
                                              
9
  In any event, as discussed above, the District Court would 
have been correct in denying Schumann’s motion for 
reconsideration even if it had accepted the statements in 
Schumann’s supplemental declaration. 
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F. Dismissal With Prejudice  
 Finally, we review the District Court’s denial of leave 
to amend for abuse of discretion, and review de novo its 
determination that amendment would be futile.  In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
 Under Rule 15(a), “the court should freely give leave 
when justice so requires.”  A district court may deny leave to 
amend a complaint where it is apparent from the record that 
“(1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad 
faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, 
or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.”  Lake 
v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).  In addition, “[a] District 
Court has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where 
the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his 
complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”  Krantz v. 
Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 
155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 
 Schumann was on notice of the deficiencies in the 
CFAC after BMS moved to dismiss the TAC with prejudice, 
and he has had many opportunities over the seven-plus years 
and five iterations of the complaint to plead facts indicating 
he was an original source; if he could plead such facts, he 
would have already done so.  See Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero 
Oil Co., 39 F.3d 70, 74 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting, where plaintiff 
sought to add facts to a twice-amended complaint, “three 
attempts at a proper pleading is enough”); see also Atkinson, 
473 F.3d at 517 (“Repleading is futile [after dismissal for lack 
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of subject matter jurisdiction] because the legal inadequacy 
cannot be solved by providing a better factual account of the 
alleged claim.”).  Accordingly, we affirm dismissal of 
Schumann’s claims with prejudice because further 
amendment would be futile. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
